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The Research and Development Tax Credit: Moderately
Effective But Hampered By Politics
Jonathan Talley*
Since the research tax credit entered the code in the Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981 as a temporary provision, legislators and schol-
ars have debated the benefits and burdens of making the credit
permanent. In this Article, I examine the effects of a permanent re-
search tax credit for businesses. After examining the history and de-
sign of the research tax credit and analyzing research expenditures of
businesses in relation to the research credit provision, I argue that a
reliable, predictable, and permanent research tax credit would maxi-
mize the benefits of the credit while minimizing the burdens.
I. INTRODUCTION
Technological innovation is a major driving force in long-term eco-
nomic growth, meaning research and development (R & D) serves as
the fuel of innovation.' Realizing this, Congress passed the research
and development tax credit in 1981 to support R & D efforts.2 Con-
gress aimed to boost private sector research and development invest-
ment by reducing the after-tax cost to firms performing qualified
research beyond a certain amount.3 The research tax credit has never
been a permanent part of the tax code and Congress renewed it on
December 17, 2010 for two more years, 2010 and 2011.4 The research
tax credit consists of five different types of credits.5
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, May 2012; B.A., Economics, University
of North Carolina, May 2009.
1. GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31181, RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTA-
TION TAX CREDIT: CURRENT STATUS AND SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1, (2008).
2. Id. In 1981, Congress passed the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Pub. L. No. 97-34,
95 Stat. 172 (codified at I.R.C. § 41 (2006)).
3. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 5.
4. H.R. 4853 - The Tax Relief Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation
Act of 2010, TITAN ARMOR (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.titanarmor.com/2010/12/legislation/gen3/
obama-signs-h-r-4853-%e2%80%93-2-year-extension-for-the-rd-tax-credit/ (indicating that the
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 retroac-
tively extended the credits for 2010 as they expired at the end of 2009. This provision lasts
through December 31, 2011, when it will expire).
5. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 3-10.
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This paper opens by providing a legislative history of the research
and development tax credit from its inception to the present. 6 It then
examines economic studies and analyzes the effectiveness of the tax
credit. Lastly, the paper concludes with ways to amend the tax credit
that would increase its effectiveness.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE RESEARCH TAX CREDIT
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 created the first federal
R & D tax credit as a temporary provision, effective through 1985.7
The Ninety-Seventh Congress created the tax credit in an attempt to
stimulate R & D spending, which had been declining throughout the
previous decade in the private sector.8 Congress concluded a "sub-
stantial tax credit for incremental research and experimental expendi-
tures was needed to overcome the reluctance of many ongoing
companies to bear the significant costs" incurred in research programs
within businesses.9
The initial provision credited twenty-five percent of qualified re-
search spending above a business's base amount.10 The base amount
equaled the entity's average annual research spending of its three pre-
vious tax years." Taxpayers that claimed the credit but were unable
to apply the entire amount against its current federal income tax lia-
bility were allowed to carry unused credits back three years or for-
ward fifteen years.12
On October 22, 1986, Congress revised and extended the research
credit by passing the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which extended the
credit through 1988.13 Congress significantly altered the credit by lim-
iting the general business credit to a yearly cap, as well as reducing the
credit rate from twenty-five percent of qualified research spending to
twenty percent of qualified research spending.' 4
Before the credit expired in 1988, Congress extended it through
1989.15 Once again in 1989, Congress extended the research credit an
additional year through 1990 by passing the Omnibus Budget Recon-
6. Updated through October 27, 2011.
7. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, § 221(a).
8. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 10.
9. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 97TH CONG., REP. ON THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX
ACT OF 1981 120 (Comm. Print 1981).
10. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, § 221(a).
11. Id.
12. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 11.
13. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
14. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 11.
15. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342.
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ciliation Act of 1989.16 Congress continued the trend of extending the
credit one year at a time in 1990 extending the credit through 1991,
and later in 1991, Congress extended the credit through July 1, 1992.17
In 1992, Congress passed two bills that would have extended the
research credit, but President George H. W. Bush vetoed both for rea-
sons not concerning the research credit's design or effectiveness.',
Congress remedied the research tax credit expiration by enacting the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.19 The Act extended the
credits retroactively from July 1, 1992, through June 30, 1995.20
The research credit expired again on June 30, 1995; however, this
time it was due to Congress' inability to pass any bill.2 1 In August
1996, Congress again passed a bill retroactively reinstating the credits
from July 1, 1996 to May 31, 1997.22 This left a one-year void in the
credit's coverage for the first time since Congress enacted the credit in
1981.23 In 1997, Congress continued the trend of letting the credits
expire only to pass a bill retroactively extending the credits.24 This
time, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 extended the credits from June
1, 1997, to June 30, 1998.25
In 1999, the credits expired once again. Yet again, Congress rein-
stated the credits with retroactive legislation through the Ticket to
Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, extending the
research credits from July 1, 1999, to June 30, 2004.26
Congressional and presidential efforts to permanently extend the
research credits explain the mid-1990s trend of expiring research tax
credits. Members of Congress and the business community de-
nounced repeated temporary extensions of the tax credit as wastes of
legislative time.27 In light of presidential remarks in support of a per-
manent extension, congressional leaders in both houses began to ne-
gotiate tax legislation including a permanent extension of the research
16. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106.
17. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388; Tax
Extension Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-227, 105 Stat. 1686.
18. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 12-13.
19. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
20. Id.
21. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 13.
22. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755.
23. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 13.
24. Id.
25. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
26. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, 113
Stat. 1860.
27. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 14.
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credit. 28 Yet no Congress and President have been able to agree on a
permanent extension due to the difficulty of reconciling the revenue
cost of a permanent extension with other budget priorities.29
In 2004, the Working Families Tax Relief Act extended the research
tax credit through 2005.30 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 revised the
research credit by adding another credit option for payments concern-
ing energy research performed under contract by qualified entities.31
However, this Act did not extend the research credit.32 In 2006, Con-
gress retroactively extended the tax credit through 2007 by passing the
Tax Relief and Health Care Act.33 More retroactive legislation fol-
lowed in 2008 with the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which
effectively extended the credit through 2009.34 Finally, on December
17, 2010, the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization,
and Job Creation Act retroactively extended the research tax credit
for the fourteenth time through 2011.35
III. How THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TAX CREDIT
WORKS TODAY
The research tax credit allows businesses to receive up to three
credits: (1) a credit equal to twenty percent of qualified research ex-
penditures exceeding the base amount;36 (2) a twenty percent credit of
basic research expenses for the taxable year; and (3) a twenty percent
credit of energy research spending. 37 The research tax credit has five
separate components: (1) a regular research credit; (2) an alternative
research credit (AIRC); (3) an alternative simplified incremental
credit (ASIC); (4) a basic research credit; and (5) an energy research
credit.38 All the credits are non-refundable, meaning the credits can-
not reduce one's tax liability to less than zero. 39 Business taxpayers
can claim the basic research credit and energy research credit in addi-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, 118 Stat. 1166.
31. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.
32. Id.
33. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922.
34. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
35. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296.
36. As previously stated, a taxpayer's base amount is an annual average of research expendi-
tures from its previous four tax years.
37. I.R.C. § 41(a)(1)-(3) (2006).
38. I.R.C. § 41.
39. Id.
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tion to choosing one of the following three credits: AIRC, ASIC, or
the regular research credit.40
Claims for credits depend on the definition of "qualified research
expenditures."4 1 There are two important parts to the definition. The
first part of the definition describes the nature of the qualified re-
search itself.42 Research must satisfy four criteria in order to be con-
sidered "qualified research" under AIRC, ASIC, and the regular
research credit.43 First, the research must comport with section 174,
which states that the research must be experimental in nature.44 To be
experimental in nature, the activities should be aimed at the develop-
ment of a new or improved product or process.4 5 Second, the research
must be undertaken for the purpose of discovering information, which
is technological in nature.46 Third, the research expenditures should
seek to gain new technical knowledge that is useful in the develop-
ment of a new or improved "business component." 4 7 A "business
component" is a product, process, computer software technique,
formula, or invention to be sold, leased, licensed, or used by the firm
performing the research.48 Fourth and finally, the research must en-
tail a process of experimentation aimed at developing a product or
process with a "(i) new or improved function, (ii) performance, or (iii)
reliability or quality."4 9 Research satisfies the four requirements if it
aims to -develop a new or improved function for a business compo-
nent, or to improve the performance, reliability, or quality of a busi-
ness component.50 On the other hand, research fails to satisfy the
"qualified research" test if its main purpose is to modify a business
component according to "style, taste, cosmetic, or seasonal design
factors."51
The second important part of the definition of "qualified research"
concerns expenses eligible for the credit.52 "Qualified expenses" arise
from in-house research as well as contract research.5 3 When dealing
40. Id.
41. § 41(d).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. § 41(d)(1)(A); see § 174.
45. Id. § 41(d)(1)(A).
46. § 41(d)(1)(B)(i).
47. § 41(d)(1)(B)(ii).
48. § 41(d)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
49. § 41(d)(3)(A)(i)-(iii).
50. § 41(d)(3).
51. § 41(d)(3)(B).
52. § 41(b)(1).
53. Id.
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with in-house research, the regular, AIRC, and ASIC credits include
wages and salaries of employees and supervisors engaged in the re-
search in addition to costs of materials, supplies, and leased computer
time.54 In contract research, the credits apply to the full amount paid
for qualified research conducted by certain firms, colleges and univer-
sities, and federal laboratories.55 However, only seventy-five percent
of payments for research performed by other research consortia are
credited, and only sixty-five percent of payments for research per-
formed by other non-profit entities dedicated to scientific research are
credited.56
Research expenditures on depreciable assets used in qualified re-
search, such as buildings and equipment, do not qualify for the re-
search tax credit.57 Neither do overhead expenses for the research
including things such as heating, electricity, rents, leasing fees, insur-
ance, property taxes, and fringe benefits of research employees.58
These expenses can account for twenty-seven to fifty percent of busi-
ness research spending, but it is unsubsidized by the government.59
A. Regular Research Credit
Congress has extended the regular research credit thirteen times
with five modifications since its inception in 1981.60 Businesses can
receive a credit equal to twenty percent of its qualified research ex-
penses beyond a base amount. 61 This structure is intended to en-
courage firms to spend more on research than they would in the
absence of the credit by crediting expenditures that exceed the aver-
age amount a firm would spend if no credit existed.62 The base
amount serves to approximate the amount a firm would spend on re-
search if the credit did not exist.63 To calculate the base amount, one
must follow two rules.64 First, the fifty percent rule states the base
amount must be equal to or greater than fifty percent of a firm's re-
search expenditures in the given tax year.65 Second, one must deter-
54. § 41(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).
55. § 41(b)(3)(D).
56. § 41(b)(3)(A), (C).
57. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 5.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. § 41(a)(1).
62. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 5.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. § 41(c).
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mine if the firm is an established firm or a start-up. 66 Established
firms have gross receipts and research expenditures in at least three
years from 1984 to 1988.67 Firms that do not qualify as established
firms qualify as start-ups.68 The base amount is the product of a fixed-
base percentage and average annual gross receipts in the previous
four tax years but the fixed-base percentage is different for start-up
firms compared to established firms.69 The fixed-base percentage of
an established firm is the ratio of its total research expenditures to
total gross receipts between 1984 and 1988, capped at sixteen per-
cent.70 The fixed-base percentage of a start-up firm is set at three per-
cent during the firm's first five tax years, and gradually, the
percentage adjusts to reflect the firm's actual expenditures, so by the
eleventh tax year, the percentage equals the firm's total research ex-
penditures compared to its total receipts in the fifth through tenth tax
years.71 In general, firms with lower fixed-base percentages have a
better chance at claiming the regular credit.72
To calculate a firm's regular research expenditures tax credit, firms
must first find the fixed-base percentage by doing the following: (1)
total the research expenses from 1984 to 1988 to get X; (2) total the
gross receipts from 1984 to 1988 to get Y; and (3) divide the research
expenses, X, by the gross receipts, Y, to determine the fixed-base per-
centage, Z.7 The next step is calculating the base amount for the cur-
rent tax year.74 There are two steps to calculate the base amount: (1)
average the annual gross receipts for the previous four tax years to get
A; and (2) multiply this average, A, by the fixed-base percentage, Z,
and the result is the base amount, B.75 Now the preparatory work is
done, and the firm is ready to calculate its regular tax credit. It must
start by taking the qualified research expenditures for the current tax
year, E, and either subtract the base amount, B, or fifty percent of the
expenditures, (.5)E, whichever is greater, to get the reduced research
expenditures, F.76 For the final step multiply the reduced expendi-
66. Id.
67. § 41(c)(3)(B).
68. Id.
69. § 41(c)(3)(B)(2).
70. § 41(c)(3)(C).
71. § 41(c)(3)(B)(2)(ii)(I)-(VII).
72. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 6.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 7.
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tures, F, by the twenty percent the IRS allows, and this, (.2)F, gives
the firm its regular research credit.77
B. Alternative Incremental Research Credit (AIRC)
Firms unable to claim the regular credit have the option to claim the
alternative incremental research credit.78 But claiming the AIRC has
future consequences because when a firm elects to claim the AIRC in
a particular tax year, it must continue to claim the AIRC in future tax
years unless the firm receives permission from the IRS to switch to
another credit. 79 This may deter firms from claiming this credit even
though they may be better off with it.80 Qualified research expendi-
tures under the AIRC are subject to the same rules as the regular
research credit.81 The AIRC is equal to three percent of a firm's re-
search expenditures above one percent but less than 1.5% of its aver-
age annual gross receipts in the previous four tax years, plus four
percent of its research expenditures above 1.5% but less than two per-
cent of its average annual gross receipts in the previous four tax years,
plus five percent of its research expenditures greater than two percent
of its average annual gross receipts in the previous four tax years.82
Firms should elect to use the AIRC if their research expenditures in
the current tax year exceed one percent of their average annual gross
receipts in the past four years. 3 The AIRC also benefits business tax-
payers who have declining research expenditures, or increasing sales
that outpace research expenditures, which lead to a high fixed-base
percentage. 84
To calculate the AIRC, firms must begin by calculating the average
annual gross receipts for the previous four years, A.85 Then multiply
this amount, A, by 1%, 1.5%, and 2% to set up the levels that differ-
ent tax credit rates apply.86 Subtract the first level, (.01)A, from the
qualified research expenses of the tax year, E.87 Repeat this step for
1.5% and 2% by subtracting (.015)A from E and (.02)A from E.88
This sets up three levels with different credit rates, hence the incre-
77. See GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 7.
78. I.R.C. § 41(c)(4) (2006).
79. § 41(c)(4)(B).
80. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 7.
81. § 41(b).
82. § 41(c)(4)(A)(i)-(iii).
83. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 7.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 8.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 8.
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mental credit: (1) a level between 1% and 1.5% of expenditures, Li;
(2) a level between 1.5% and 2% of expenditures, L2; and (3) a level
between two percent and one hundred percent of expenditures, L3.89
Expenditures between 1% and 1.5% are credited at 3%, so multiply
Li by .03 to get the first part of the credit, C1.90 Expenditures be-
tween 1.5% and 2% are credited at 4%, so multiply L2 by .04 to get
the second part of the credit, C2.91 Expenditures between 2% and
100% are credited at 3.75%, so multiply L3 by .0375 to get the third
credit, C3.92 Add the three credits together and that is what the busi-
ness can receive as its alternative incremental research tax credit.93
C. Alternative Simplified Incremental Credit (ASIC)
The ASIC allows a business taxpayer to claim this credit instead of
the regular credit or AIRC.9 4 The ASIC is equal to fourteen percent
of a firm's research expenditures in the current tax year exceeding
fifty percent of its average research expenditures in the previous three
tax years.95 If a firm has no research expenditures in any of the previ-
ous three years, then the credit is equal to six percent of its research
expenditures in the current year.96 Similar to the AIRC, an election
to claim the ASIC binds a firm to take the ASIC in future tax years
unless the IRS consents to the firm claiming a different research
credit.97
A firm calculates its ASIC by finding its average research expendi-
tures in the previous three years, A.9 8 The firm then subtracts fifty
percent of this average, (.5)A, from its current research expenditures
in the taxable year, E, giving the firm its reduced expenditures, F.99
Finally, the firm multiplies the credit rate of fourteen percent by its
reduced expenditures, (.14)F, to get its tax credit, C.' 00
89. See id.
90. See id. at 9.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 9.
94. I.R.C § 41(a) (2006).
95. § 41(c)(5)(A).
96. § 41(c)(5)(B)(ii).
97. § 41(c)(5)(C).
98. See GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 9.
99. See id.
100. See id.
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D. Basic Research Credit
The goal of the basic research credit is to promote collaborative
research between firms, colleges, and universities. 01 The credit is
equal to twenty percent of total payments for research above a "quali-
fied organization base period amount," which is different from the
"base amount" referred to in the code.102 The base period amount is
like the base amount in that it intends to approximate what firms
would spend in the absence of the credit, but that is the extent of the
similarities between the base amount and the base period amount.103
Basic research is defined as "any original investigation for the ad-
vancement of scientific knowledge not having a specific commercial
objective." 104 The basic research credit only applies to research ex-
penditures performed under a written contract by educational institu-
tions, nonprofit scientific research organizations, and certain grant-
giving organizations. 0 5 The credit does not apply to research done
outside the United States or in the social sciences, the arts, or the
humanities.106 Firms conducting their own basic research are unable
to claim this credit, but they can claim the regular credit, AIRC, or
ASIC.107
E. Energy Research Credit
Business taxpayers may claim a tax credit equal to twenty percent
of payments to certain entities for energy research. 08 To qualify, the
payments must be made to an energy research consortium that is a
non-profit organization exempt from taxation or is "organized and op-
erated primarily to conduct energy research in the public interest." 09
Also, the energy organization must receive contributions from at least
five unrelated persons for energy research where no single person
pays more than fifty percent of the total amounts received by the en-
ergy organization.'1 0 The energy research credit is a flat tax credit as
opposed to the other four research credits that are incremental, mak-
ing the energy credit more generous than the others."'
101. Id.
102. § 41(a)(ii), (e)(1)(A).
103. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 9.
104. § 41(e)(7).
105. § 41(e)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
106. § 41(e)(7)(A)(i)-(ii).
107. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 10.
108. § 41(a)(3).
109. § 41(f)(6)(A)(i)(II).
110. § 41(f)(6)(A)(iii)-(iv).
111. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 10.
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IV. THE RESEARCH TAX CREDIT'S EFFECTIVENESS
There are two approaches to evaluate the effectiveness of a tax pol-
icy designed to subsidize, and thus correct, the supply of a good.112
The first approach examines whether the policy stimulates a social re-
turn that is at least equal to the social cost. 13 This involves comparing
the marginal return of dollars spent to subsidize research to the op-
portunity cost of using the same dollars in another way, such as educa-
tional funding. 114 The social cost of the credit equals the net loss in
tax revenue because of the credit and the costs of administering the
credit.115 However, because of the difficulties in measuring the social
returns to research"16 and the hypothetical marginal return of oppor-
tunity cost, analysts usually use a second method.17
The second approach examines the additional research and devel-
opment stimulated by the credit and compares the value of that re-
search and development with the tax revenue lost because of the
credit."18 This approach assumes the public benefits more from the
research returns than the private sector." 9 If the credit stimulates
more dollars spent on research than the cost of the tax credit, then
proponents can make the case that the tax credit is a cost-effective
way to increase research spending.120 However, if the lost tax dollars
exceed the additional research expenditures the credit creates, then
direct research subsidies are more cost-effective in boosting research
investment.121
To determine the amount of research investment the tax credit cre-
ates, analysts must find the additional research and development con-
ducted due to the credit.122 Some studies have reached differing
estimates of how much additional research the credit creates, but an
overwhelming majority of studies find at least a one to one ratio of
additional research to lost tax revenue:123 A study conducted by
112. BRONWYN H. HALL, EFFECTIVENESS OF RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION TAX CRED-
Irs: CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN 8 (1995).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 14.
116. Id.
117. HALL, supra note 112, at 8.
118. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 14.
119. Id. at 15.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.; HALL, supra note 112, at 10 (discussing whether the subsidy is more efficiently
achieved through a tax credit or government grant).
123. See AEROSPACE INDUS. Ass'N, A SPECIAL REPORT: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TAX
CREDIT, 4. KPMG found a 1:1 ratio in the short run and a 2:1 ratio in the long run. Bloom,
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Professors Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen found the credit stimu-
lates $1.10 of research for every dollar of tax revenue lost.12 4 Another
study conducted over ten years found a greater stimulation of one tax
dollar generating approximately two dollars in additional research.125
Another study, by Professors Klassen, Pittman, and Reed, found that
the tax credit induces nearly three dollars of additional research in-
vestment for every tax dollar spent.126 The Bureau of Labor Statistics
estimates a one-to-one ratio with every tax dollar spent creating an
additional dollar of research. 127
A KPMG study found the tax credit stimulated similar additional
research expenditures as tax revenue lost in the short term.128 But in
the long term, one dollar of lost tax revenue ends up creating two
dollars of additional research investment. 129 Thus implying long-run
gains in GDP, which is supported by the fact additional research
spending means more domestic jobs since the majority of tax credit
dollars are directed towards wages:130 "A 2008 Ernst and Young study
estimates 70 percent of the tax credit's benefits are used to pay sala-
ries." 131 Had the government not extended the credit in 2010, the
country could have lost as many as 120,000 jobs domestically.13 2 Fur-
thermore, the economy grows with the accumulation of R & D or
human capital.133 One commentator notes, "R&D can increase out-
puts without decreasing returns through productivity growth because
R&D can be shared by multiple actors without additional costs." 1 3 4
Because even conservative estimates show that for every dollar of
tax revenue lost at least one dollar of additional research is created,
the tax credit is more effective than a government grant,135 which
Griffith, and Van Reenen found a ratio of 1.1:1. A ten-year study found a ratio of 2:1. A Klas-
sen, Pittman, and Reed study found a 2.96:1 ratio.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. AEROSPACE INDUs Ass'N, supra note 123, at 4. KPMG found a 1:1 ratio in the short
term, but a 2:1 ratio in the long run.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. James Brett, Congress Must Extend the R & D Tax Credit for Growth, MASS HIGH TECH
(Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.masshightech.com/stories/2010/01/18/editorial3-Congress-must-ext
end-the-RD-tax-credit-for-growth.html.
132. Id.
133. Yujeung Ho, Evaluating the Effectiveness of State R & D Tax Credits 2 (2006) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh) (on file with author), available at http://d-
scholarship.pitt.eduL/1186/.
134. Id.
135. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
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would give private firms money to invest on research.136 Further-
more, in the long run, $1.75 of additional tax revenue would be gener-
ated for each dollar the government spends on the credit, creating a
net gain for both taxpayers and the government. 137
While comparing increased research investment to foregone tax
revenue is a useful tool, the net benefit the credit provides for society
is more important. Economists estimate that half of United States ec-
onomic productivity after World War Two is attributable to the types
of technical progress that results from science and engineering re-
search.138 Studies show that the median social rate of return on re-
search investment in general exceeds twice the median private rate of
return.139
The tax credit also has a spillover effect. The spillover effect in re-
search and development is illustrated by one firm's innovations or im-
provements helping another firm's productivity or by one person's
skills and knowledge helping another person in unintended ways.140
These spillover externalities cause social return to outpace private re-
turn: "[R]eturns from R&D are not fully appropriable by the firm,
but knowledge leaks out to competitors such that social benefit is
higher than private return." 141 Economist Joel Popkin supported this
theory and stated, "[I]t is widely agreed that firms doing R&D do not
capture all or even most of their investment through the price mecha-
nism. The existence of the essentially 'free' spillovers means the social
return from R&D exceeds the private return." 142
Without public subsidy, firms may under-invest in research due to
the externalities it confers on other firms, including competitors. 143
Under-investment would lead to fewer social benefits and even fewer
dollars spent on research investment.144 The credit leads to more re-
search investment, which in turn leads to more spillover. 145 If the spil-
lover reaches high enough points, firms have increasing incentives to
136. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 15; HALL, supra note 112, at 18.
137. R & D CREDIT COALITION, TAX CREDIT FOR R & D: PERMANENCY Now! 10 (2004),
www.investinamericasfuture.org/PDFs/227041.pdf.
138. ALLISON SAYLER, AM. Ass'N OF ENGINEERING SOCIETIEs, R&E TAX CREDIT (June 16,
1998), http://www.aaes.org/publicpolicy/6-16-98.asp.
139. Id.
140. Ho, supra note 133, at 29.
141. Dirk Czarnitzki et al., The Relationship Between R&D Collaboration, Subsidies and R&D
Performance: Empirical Evidence from Finland and Germany, 22 J. APPLIED ECONOMETRICS
1347, 1350 (2007).
142. R & D CREDIT COALITION, supra note 137, at 9.
143. Czarnitzki et al., supra note 141, at 1350.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1351.
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engage in research collaborations, thus enhancing social welfare.146
Finally, cooperating in research and development results in higher re-
search investment compared to no collaboration levels of research in-
vestment.147 From this, one can envision a reinforcing cycle: more
research leads to more benefits leading to more research, but on the
contrary, less research means fewer benefits leading to even less
research.
In 1992, a Griliches study, by reviewing prior analyses, concluded
that research and development spillovers exist and generate a higher
social rate of return than the private rate.148 Additionally, a Jones and
Williams study from 1998 concluded that the social rate of return
ranged from thirty percent to one hundred percent while the private
rate of return averaged seven percent.149 Spillover effects even have
an indirect impact on firms that do not receive tax credits.o50 Most
knowledge spillovers originate in large firms and universities and spil-
lover to small firms within a geographical proximity of one another.' 5'
Spillovers support the legitimization of the tax credit because large
firms directly benefit from the tax credit by reducing taxable income,
and small firms are indirect beneficiaries through knowledge spil-
lovers.152 This allows the program to apply broadly and benefit both
large and small firms.'53
Because research and development generates positive externalities
but is likely to be under-invested in the private sector and generates a
higher social rate of return than private return, government interven-
tion to spur private research investment is a logical development.154
One criticism of the research tax credit is that it unnecessarily subsi-
dizes companies for research they would have conducted without a tax
credit. Direct government intervention affects private research invest-
ment in one of two ways: stimulation or crowding out.155 Stimulation
occurs when funding generates more private research investment than
without the credit.156 This establishes a complementary relationship
and ultimately leads to productivity growth.'57 Stimulation could be
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Ho, supra note 133, at 29.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 31.
151. Id. at 32.
152. Id.
153. Ho, supra note 133, at 32.
154. Id. at 33.
155. Id. at 69.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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expected if the research tax credits successfully spur specific research
investment in areas essential to future productivity growth but that
otherwise might be avoided by private firms based on high risk and
uncertainty without the credit.'15
Crowding out occurs when the tax credit merely subsidizes private
research investment that firms might make at their own expense.159
Thus, there is no additional research investment but only the same
continued research. The continued research occurs with a lower cost
to the private firm and greater cost to the public.o60 A 1996 Industrial
Research Institute spending survey found that fifty-five percent of re-
sponding companies indicated that the credit was "not at all" influen-
tial in establishing the level of their research investment.161 Although
anecdotal, this research exemplifies the problem that the credit may
not actually be encouraging research investment but only subsidizing
it. Recent domestic and foreign studies contrast this evidence and
show that a dollar of foregone tax stimulates at least a dollar of re-
search spending.162 In addition, the tax credit system helps to ensure
that the net effect is stimulation, not crowding out. Because tax cred-
its are indirect subsidies that reduce research costs based on increasa-
ble taxable incomes and research spending, crowding out is generally
not expected. 163 The crowding out effect is most prevalent as a nega-
tive result of direct subsidies.'"
V. WHY A PERMANENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
TAX CREDIT IS NECESSARY
Although the tax credit creates significant benefits, a permanent ex-
tension of the credit would increase the benefits of the credit. The
credit has never been a permanent provision of the tax code, despite
numerous congressional attempts to make the credit permanent. 65
The most important hindrance to the credit's effectiveness is its tem-
porary nature.166 Continually renewing one and two-year extensions
158. Ho, supra note 133, at 69.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 69-70.
161. Robert D. Atkinson, Expanding the R&E Tax Credit to Drive Innovation, Competitive-
ness and Prosperity, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 617, 619 (2007).
162. Id.
163. Ho, supra note 133, at 70. Grants and loans are direct subsidies because they are pay-
ments in cash or kind. Tax incentives are indirect subsidies because it creates a cost below the
market rate, but the firm still bears some of the cost.
164. Id.
165. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 18.
166. SAYLER, supra note 138.
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of the credit is a more costly and much less efficient policy than a
permanent credit.167
The lack of permanence weakens the credit's incentive effect.
Many firms plan their research and development projects more than a
few years in advance. 168 Currently, when planning a research project
spanning multiple years, business managers cannot count on receiving
the credit over the life of the project.169 Thus, business managers are
unlikely to account for possible credits when setting their annual
budget.170 This defeats the entire purpose of the tax credit because it
means the credit has little to no influence on their decisions.171
Whereas with a permanent credit, business managers could plan on
the credit due to its certainty, and the credit would have an impact in
their final determination.17 2
Another harm stemming from an uncertain continuing credit is a
lapse in coverage. Gaps in coverage, such as the lack of a credit in
1996, greatly burden firms' planning efforts.'73 One commentator
notes, "Although the program has been around for 30 years and en-
joys bi-partisan legislative support, it has yet to be made permanent.
The R&D credit has expired numerous times before being retroac-
tively renewed." 174 The uncertainty of the credit restricts new
projects, limits opportunities, and curtails high value job growth.175
Legislators justified the temporary nature of the credit as a way to
review the credit's performance and effectiveness.176 Nevertheless,
the credit has been in place for thirty years, which is more than
enough time to review the credit's effectiveness, as demonstrated by
the many studies measuring its effectiveness.177 Presidents and Con-
gresses of both parties have called for a permanent extension, but
have ultimately kept it temporary because it reduces deficit
projections.178
167. Id.
168. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 18.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 18.
174. Brandon Edwards, It's Time to Make R&D Tax Credit Permanent, Assure U.S. Remains
World's Top Innovator, HUFIMNGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
brandon-edwardsits-time-to-make-rd-tax-c b_709018.html.
175. Id.
176. SAYLER, supra note 138.
177. Id.
178. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 18.
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Investing in a permanent credit is a good business decision with a
high rate of return. A permanent credit coupled with a twenty-five
percent increase could boost real GDP by 206.3 billion dollars, gener-
ate 270,000 manufacturing jobs, and raise total employment by
510,000 within a decade. 179 Making the credit permanent would cost
an estimated eighty-five billion dollars over ten years.180 Not only
would a permanent extension provide this return on investment, it
would contribute to the global competitiveness of the United
States.181
VI. HOPE FOR THE FUTURE?
Currently, a bipartisan group of congressional leaders is pushing for
legislation designed to simplify and strengthen the research and devel-
opment tax credit. The legislators favor increasing the credit from
fourteen percent to twenty percent, along with making the credit per-
manent for business and investors. 182 One representative points out,
"There are very few easy answers to improving the economic outlook
of our nation" . . . "[blut updating the R&D tax credit is one of
them."'8 3  Another representative stated, "America is the world's
leading innovator-developing life-saving technologies, state-of-the
art computer systems, and breakthrough manufacturing products-
but we're losing ground to competitors around the world."1 8 4 The
United States was an innovator back in 1981 when the government
implemented the research tax credit.185 The United States was among
the first nations to promote research incentives, but by 2002, nations
including Spain, Netherlands, Portugal, Canada, Australia, Denmark,
and the United Kingdom outspent the United States on research and
development incentives relative to gross domestic product.186
179. Edwards, supra note 174.
180. Jackie Calmes, Obama to Pitch Permanent Research Tax Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
2010, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/05/us/politics/05tax.html.
181. Edwards, supra note 174.
182. Sarah C. Tung, Lawmakers Unite to Make R&D Tax Credit Permanent, HEARST NEWSPA-
PERS, Mar. 18, 2011, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-03-18/business/29141148 1_r-d-
tax-credit-credit-expansion-job-creation.
183. Id. (statement of Rep. Anna Eshoo).
184. John Cummings, Why an Enhanced R&D Tax Credit Is a Total No-Brainer and We Need
It Right Now, BIG FAT FIN. BLOG (Mar. 18, 2011), (quoting Rep. John B. Larson, http://www.
larson.house.gov/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=1251&Itemid= 9 9 ), http://
bigfatfinanceblog.com/2011/03/18/why-an-enhanced-rd-tax-credit-is-a-total-no-brainer-and-we-
need-it-right-now/.
185. Id.
186. SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, TAX INCENTIVES FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: TRENDS AND ISSUES
21-22 (2002).
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Putting competition aside, it is still beneficial for the United States
to follow through with the American Research and Competitiveness
Act to avoid the wasted time and inefficiency of re-passing the re-
search tax credit every other year. The current situation bears all the
costs of a permanent research tax credit without any of the benefits
because the taxpayers are paying for the credit to be continued every
year, but corporate leaders never know from one year to the next
whether their long-term research efforts will be subsidized by the
credit when Congress reexamines it.187 As of now, the American Re-
search and Competitiveness Act is growing in popularity and has the
support of trade associations and industry groups.""' Five organiza-
tions endorse the bill including the American Chemistry Council, the
National Association of Manufacturers, the Association Connecting
Electronics Industries, Business Software Alliance, and Telecommuni-
cations Industry Association. 189 More illustrative, there are no orga-
nizations opposing the Act.190 Currently, the Bill is assigned to a
congressional committee, which will consider the Bill before possibly
passing it on to the House or Senate as a whole. 191 Of individuals
visiting the PopVox website, an overwhelming eighty-seven percent
support the Bill as of April 7, 2011.192 In addition, the Obama-Biden
plan to revitalize the economy in this recession includes a platform of
making the research and development tax credit permanent.193 The
plan states,
Barack Obama and Joe Biden want investments in a skilled re-
search and development workforce and technology infrastructure to
be supported here in America so that American workers and com-
munities will benefit. Obama and Biden want to make the Re-
search and Development tax credit permanent so that firms can rely
on it when making decisions to invest in domestic R&D over multi-
year timeframes.194
This push for a permanent research and development tax credit is
eerily similar to the failed attempts preceding it. A permanent re-
search tax credit would greatly improve the credit's effectiveness;
however, it is only a start.
187. Cummings, supra note 184.
188. Id.
189. What's Your Position on H.R. 942? PoPVox (last visited Apr. 8, 2011, 01:58 AM), https:/
/www.popvox.com/bills/us/112/hr942.
190. Id.
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193. Obama-Biden Plan, CHANGE.GOV (Apr. 8, 2011), http://change.gov/agenda/economy
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194. Id.
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VII. AN EFFICIENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TAX CREDIT
Making the research and development tax credit permanent is the
first and foremost fix the credit needs that would improve its effective-
ness. Secondly, like many other tax credits, complexity hinders the
credit's effectiveness.
A permanent research tax credit would cost an estimated 8.5 billion
dollars a year' 95 while promoting at least that much in increased re-
search and development investment.196 In addition, this would allow
companies to finally embark on complex, multi-year research that
firms currently shy away from due to the temporary nature of the
credit.197 Expert estimates differ on the exact effect of a permanent
credit but range from 162,000 to 510,000 additional jobs, around 7.5
billion dollars of increased research and development spending, and
206 billion dollars more GDP.198 When Congress extends the re-
search credit every other year, it charges taxpayers the cost of a per-
manent credit without reaping all the benefits of certainty in the
private sector. A permanent research tax credit would increase the
effectiveness of the credit immensely without charging the taxpayers a
premium, and so it is the most imperative modification to the credit.
The research credit's complexity also is a deterrent to its effective-
ness. Instead of having five separate credits, with an option to claim
up to three, the credit should be pared down to just the regular re-
search credit. By changing statutory definitions of qualified research
to encompass more types of research, specifically college and univer-
sity research, as well as energy research, the Energy Credit and Basic
Research Credit could be eliminated completely from the code.199
These expenditures would now be credited under the regular research
credit. This would not require any credit rate changes either because
all three credits share a credit rate equal to twenty percent of expendi-
tures above a base amount.200
The AIRC and ASIC are complicated substitutes for the regular
research credit, giving firms the option of electing to pursue one of the
three. The AIRC and ASIC are alternatives for firms that do not in-
crease research spending year to year and therefore do not qualify for
195. See Calmes, supra note 180.
196. GUENTHER, supra note 1, at 15.
197. See Obama-Biden Plan, supra note 193.
198. Karen Gellender, Senator Gillibrand Announces Plans for Research and Development
Tax Credit at County Firm, MINEOLA AM. (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://www.antonnews.
comnineolaamerican/news/13433-senator-gillibrand-announces-plans-for-research-and-develop
ment-tax-credit-at-county-firm.html; Edwards, supra note 174.
199. I.R.C. § 41(a)(2)-(3), (e)(1)(A) (2006).
200. See id.
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the Regular Credit.2 0 1 However, the nature of the AIRC and ASIC
dissuades these firms from increasing their spending, so these alter-
nate models also need modification. Once a firm elects to use the
AIRC or ASIC model, it is locked in for future years to use that
credit. 202 This means if a firm that usually spent the same amount on
research, and thus used the AIRC credit, increased its research spend-
ing, it would not be credited for the increased expenditures at the bet-
ter rate of the Regular Credit. Because of this, that firm has no great
incentive to increase its research spending. A hybrid credit would fix
that.
If firms' expenditures up to a base amount, say an average of the
previous three years of research expenditures, were credited at a
lower rate, fourteen percent, and spending above the base amount
was credited at a higher amount, twenty percent, there would be an
incentive to spend more on research than in previous years but no
penalty for only spending the same amount.203 This would embrace
the legislators' intention of not penalizing firms that consistently
spend the same amount on research while also incorporating the ini-
tial goal of the research tax credit to increase research spending.204
This would also eliminate the need of firms to choose a credit and be
locked into that credit for years to come.
Implementing a hybrid model in place of the Regular Credit,
AIRC, and ASIC would eliminate the inefficiencies of having to
choose one of three different credits available while still retaining the
purposes and goals of why they were created in the first place. Also,
by expanding the definition of qualified research to include energy
spending along with university and college research, the Energy
Credit and Basic Research Credit could also be eliminated. This
would leave one credit in place for everyone to use and would greatly
simplify the process without sacrificing exclusion of possible research.
The research and development tax credit would increase its effec-
tiveness with two simple changes: making the credit a permanent pro-
vision and modifying the five different available credits into one
201. Because the Regular Credit is based on a twenty percent credit of expenditures above a
base amount and the base amount is determined from previous research expenditures, firms that
spend consistently the same amount would be left out of the credit completely without the AIRC
and ASIC.
202. I.R.C. § 41(a)(2)-(3), (e)(1)(A) (2006).
203. The fourteen percent rate is the current rate of the AIRC and the twenty percent rate is
the current Regular Credit rate.
204. This model incorporates the reasoning of not penalizing firms for spending the same
amount year to year, which is why Congress created the AIRC and ASIC in the first place, while
also keeping the higher rate to incentivize increased spending.
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hybrid credit. This hybrid credit would create the best of both worlds
without excluding any research expenditures available under any of
the five current credits.

